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Abstract
A global multi-sectoral, multi-regional computational general equilib-
rium model is employed to assess carbon taxes under perfect competition
and monopoly. We found that regional studies of carbon taxation maybe
inaccurate due to the carbon emission spillover eﬀects. Emission taxes
have stronger impacts on the economy in monopoly rather than on perfect
competition in terms of magnitude. In addition, carbon emission tax pol-
icy analysis which is based on perfect competition may also underestimate
the losses of welfare compared with the case in imperfect competition.
JEL classiﬁcation: D43, D58, L13
Keywords: environmental taxation, imperfect competition, Computable
General Equilibrium
1 Introduction
Environmental taxes can have signiﬁcant impacts for the international com-
petitiveness of industries. As the relative production costs of energy related
intensive goods rise in comparison to the relative costs of producing the same
product elsewhere, emission reduction implies a loss of comparative advantage.
Therefore, regions with emission control may suﬀer welfare losses relative the
regions with no emission control.
Most of the existing energy environmental studies assume that energy sec-
tors are operated in the perfect competition market structure (Boehringer et.
al.(1997), Pezzey (1993) and Burniaus et. al.(1992). However, in the real world,
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1energy sectors in most countries and regions are not in the perfect competition
market structure but in monopoly or oligopoly structure, especially in the de-
veloping countries, monopoly in energy sectors are more prevailing. Therefore
the assumption that energy sectors are operated under perfect competition may
lead to inaccurate conclusion.
In addition, there did exist very few literatures regarding energy and environ-
mental taxation under imperfect competition in regional or national level.(e.g.
Boehringer et. al(2001). Most of the other studies consider only emission taxes
under perfect competition in the regional or national level. (see Nwaobi(2004),
Kainuma et. al (2004), Jensen et al(2000)). However, energy emission is as
world economy becomes more integrated and emission , energy trade between
regions at the global level needs to be considered.
This paper investigates the welfare implication of carbon emission tax under
diﬀerent market structures. In our study, we conduct a comparative analysis
regarding CO2 emission taxes on energy sectors in both perfect competition
and imperfect competition(monopoly) in four regions (the USA, Japan, the EU
and RoA1). The empirical analysis of this paper focuses on two questions:
(1)to what extent the carbon emission taxes diﬀer in imperfect competition
(monopoly) relative to perfect competition; (2)what are the macroeconomic
impact and sectoral eﬀects incurred by carbon taxes under perfect competition
and monopoly. We address these questions in the context of a static general
equilibrium model with 8 aggregated global regions and 17 sectors based on
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)-E data base.
The results presented here conﬁrm standard intuition from microeconomic
theory and taxation literature: emission taxes increase the cost of production
in energy sectors and result in losing output and employment in energy sectors.
(see Goulder, 1994; Boehringer, et. al, 1997). Our calculation shows that
carbon emission taxes have stronger adverse eﬀects on the regions that have
carbon emission abatement. The welfare and output decline relative to other
regions without carbon emission abatement. More importantly, studies in this
paper implies that emission taxes based on perfect competition scenario may
underestimate the welfare losses of those countries that have carbon emission
abatement targets. Furthermore, on the regional or national level, emission
taxes may overlook the interregional energy trade and external emission spillover
eﬀects.
The results presented in this paper are subject to some important caveats.
First, there exist some problems due to imperfect information when we calibrate
the ﬁrm’s cost function. The second limitation of the paper is that we do not
consider sensitivity analysis in this study. Clearly, this study can be further
extended to this direction.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to
describe the model structure, which emphasizes the production, consumption
and international trade. Data source and simulation design of the model are
described in section 3. The interpretation of the model results is analyzed in
section 4 and ﬁnally, concluding remarks is provided in section 5.
22 Modelling Framework
A modiﬁed version of GTAP model (Hertel (1997) with imperfect competition
feature is established to evaluate the global welfare changes and sectoral eﬀect in
diﬀerent market structures. This section brieﬂy describes the model’s structure,
outlines the solution procedure, and discusses the data and parameters.
2.1 Environmental Framework
An extended version of GTAP-E 1, GTAP Technical Paper No.142 and GTAP-
EF 3 is a global, multi-regional, multi-commodity, applied general equilibrium(AGE)
model. It is composed of 8 regions and 17 commodities. As shown in Table
1, 7 commodities are agriculture related products, 5 are energy related prod-
ucts. This model incorporates global production, consumption, trade and oﬀers
a systematic way of determining the likely pattern of changes in factor and
commodity prices, and production around the world in response to changes in
environmental taxes. The complex linages among sectors and regions are taken
into account.
Table 1: Sectors, primary factors and regions in the general equilibrium model
Sectors Endowment Region
1 Rice 1 Land 1 USA
2 Wheat 2 Lab 2 EU
3 CerCrops 3 Capital 3 EEFSU
4 VegFruits 4 NatlRes 4 JPN
5 Animals 5 RoA1
6 Forestry 6 EEx
7 Fishing 7 CHIND











1GTAP-E was developed by Jean-Marc Burniaux and Truong (2002)
2GTAP Technical Paper No 14, titled ’Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition’ in the
GTAP Model, was developed by Joseph F. Francois.
3GTAP-EF was extended by Roberto Roson (2003)
32.2 Economic Framework
2.2.1 Firm Production
Producers in all the sectors except energy sectors maximize proﬁts and oper-
ate in perfect competitive market structure which implies that marginal costs
equal commodity price. A commodity is produced from a composite input ob-
tained by combining a composite primary factor (including energy input) and
a composite intermediary product using a Leontief technology. The composite
primary factor input is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) composite of
natural resource, land, labor and capital-energy composite inputs. The capital-
energy composite inputs can be further decomposed to physical capital and en-
ergy composite capital. The production structure and capital-energy composite
structure can be seen from Appendix A Figure 1 and Figure 2. The composite
intermediate input consists of 17 composite commodity inputs4. Each of the
17 commodity inputs is derived from nested CES cost functions. There are
two stages of composting intermediate inputs. In the ﬁrst stage, the producer
chooses the intermediate inputs from diﬀerent regions, and then from domestic
and foreign regions. The Allen partial elasticities of substitution for these CES
functions can be found in GTAP-E document.
Product diﬀerentiation between imports and domestic products, and imports
by region of origin are according to the Armington assumption(1969). All factor
inputs are fully employed and immobile across the regions. Land and natural
resources are perfectly mobile across sectors. All factors inputs expect capital
energy composite inputs are homogenous.
Energy composite in this modiﬁed GTAP model is then combined with capi-
tal to produce an energy-capital composite, which is in turn combined with other
primary factors in a value-added-energy (VAE) nest through a CES structure
(see Figure 1). The substitution elasticity between capital and the energy com-
posite (±KE ) is still assumed to be positive. The values of the substitution
elasticity at a lower level are set smaller according to GTAP-E model.
Each energy composite supplies services to 17 commodity producing sec-
tors according to constant-elasticity-of-transformation (CET) function. Each
of these 17 sectors uses land, natural resources and capital while each energy
sector is capital speciﬁc. The CET functions, which restrict capital’s mobility
among sectors, allow energy composite capital to shift among economic sectors
without losing capital’s inherent productivity diﬀerences.
In single output sector, the ﬁnal composite input is equal to sector out-
put. Regional production of electricity, non-electricity, oil gas and other energy
related sectors is the sum of production across the 7 capital speciﬁc energy sec-
tors. Regional output of rice, wheat and other non energy sectors is the sum of
production across respective sectors as well.
4see Appendix B
42.2.2 Market Structure
In our model, we assume that each region and each energy sector has a monopo-
listic ﬁrm. The monopolist faces a downward-sloping demand curve, or so-called
the industry demand curve. The downward sloping demand curve implies that if
the monopolist wants to sell more, it must lower its price. The ﬁrm can charge
only one price (We assume that there is no price discrimination). Since the
monopolist must lower price to sell more, the extra or marginal revenue it gets
from selling another unit is less than the price it charges. Thus, its marginal
revenue curve lies below its demand curve. In contrast, in the case of perfect
competition, demand is identical with marginal revenue.
Demand = Marginal 
Benefit to buyers
Marginal Revenue = 









Figure 3. Perfect Competition vs. Monopoly
As shown in Figure 3, in order to maximize proﬁt, the monopolist attempts
to set marginal cost equal to marginal revenue, or reduce output to Q0. While
from the consumer’s viewpoint, the best amount to produce would be Q1. The
ﬁrm will not have interest to produce beyond Q0, since the marginal revenue
curve is less than the extra cost of production, shown by the marginal cost
curve. In contrast, extra output is in the interests of consumers because the


























Figure 4. Monopoly restricts output relative to Perfect 
competition
In terms of the production-possibilities frontier shown in Figure 4, in our
model, we have energy sectors to be monopolized while all other industries are
competitive in each region. Monopolists will produce at point B while in the
perfect competition, producers (sellers are price takers)would produce at point
A. Consumers would be better oﬀ at point A because the gain of x amount
of monopolized energy goods has a greater value than the loss of y amount of
competitive non-energy goods. In other words, marginal rates of substitution
are not equal to marginal rate of transformation, the economy produces the
wrong mix of products.
Theoretically, the eﬀect of emission taxes varies depending on diﬀerent mar-
ket structures. Due to the externality involved by of energy sectors, the optimal
environment taxation in a perfect competitive market, an emission tax equal to
marginal external damages of pollution secures the socially optimal amount of
output and pollution in the long run. While considering the case of monopolist,
Buchanan (1969) pointed out that the use of eﬄuent fees equal to marginal ex-
ternal damages of pollution, as in the case of competitive markers, will not lead
to optimality and can even decrease social welfare. Katsoulacos et. al. (1996)
and Barneet (1980) argue that in a monopolistic market, the optimal emission
tax is less than marginal external damages of pollution. This optimal second-
best tax balances, therefore, between welfare losses from restricting the already
suboptimal monopolist output with welfare gains due to emission reductions.
In our paper, we focus on the eﬀects of same level of environmental taxes on
the economy rather than what kind of the taxes are optimal.
62.2.3 Consumer Consumption
In each region, a representative household maximizes utility such that regional
income is allocated in ﬁxed value shares across private consumption, government
services, and saving. Private house-hold demands are represented by the con-
stant diﬀerence of elasticities (CDE) implicit expenditure function. Referring
to the Armington(1969), domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by their
origin. The third and fourth levels describe the choice between products from
diﬀerent geographical origins through CES functions. For imperfect competi-
tion sectors, a Dixit-Stiglitz formulation is used at the last level. The consumer
chooses between horizontally-diﬀerentiated varieties of each good with a con-
stant elasticity of substitution (see Figure 5).
2.2.4 International Trade
Savings ﬁnance investment. Global saving is the sum of regional savings. A
global interests rate determines the capital investment and ﬂows. Current ac-
count is not necessary balance for each country from the global aspect. If saving
is greater than investment for one country, then it has trade surplus; otherwise
it has trade deﬁcit.
3 The data and Simulation Design
The economic data by region, sector, and commodity are taken from GTAP-E
6.1 version Jean-Marc Burniaux and Truong (2002). The elasticities of substi-
tution between diﬀerent factors of production in energy sectors are also based
on GTAP-E data base.
In order to evaluate the eﬀects of environment on energy sectors, we under-
take the comparative analysis of perfect competition and monopoly by present-
ing estimated macroeconomic and sectoral output eﬀects for our experiments.
The ﬁrst simulation results involve constant return to scale (CRTS) in perfect
competition, and server as a reference experiment. The second experiment in-
volves monopoly. We assume that there is one energy ﬁrm in each energy sector
and each region has monopoly power features domestically or regionally. While
all other 12 sectors in each region are in perfect competition and CRTS feature.
The parameters, elasticities of substitution can be found in GTAP-E documents.
We impose similar closures and shocks as GTAP-E in the case of no emission
trade scenario with perfect competition and monopoly. Please note that the re-
gions where we have imposed carbon taxes are USA, EU, Japan and RoA1. In
order to compare the same emission taxes in perfect competition and monopoly,
we ﬁrst impose GTAP-E shocks of emission target reduction to four regions in
perfect competition scenario. Next we allow the computer system to calculate
endogenously the nominal emission tax rate given ﬁxed emission target reduc-
tion. Afterwards we use this calculated emission tax rates as exogenous shocks in
monopoly scenario. The closure and shocks can be available upon request. We
7assume the revenue from the carbon tax is redistributed to private households
in a lump sum fashion.
4 Interpreting the Model Results
4.1 Macroeconomic Eﬀects
The following contents show the required rate of carbon tax and the induced
percentage changes in macroeconomic indicators as compared to the benchmark
level.
Table 2: Welfare Changes under Perfect Competition and Monopoly (million $)










Table 2 shows the eﬀect of carbon emission reduction on welfare changes in
all eight regions across the world given the same level of emission tax. Under
both scenarios, welfare5 does not change qualitatively in most of the regions
except CHIND(China and India). The magnitude of changes in each region
is slightly signiﬁcant in the EU and the USA and insigniﬁcant in most other
regions . Most of the regions have welfare losses under monopoly.
It is not surprising to see that CHIND has welfare gain under perfect com-
petition while losses are under monopoly. Under perfect competition, CHIND
gain due to no emission control target. However, China is one of the top three
energy consumers in the global energy market. Under monopoly, global energy
output decreases due to carbon emission control, CHIND suﬀers a loss due to
import of higher price of energy related products.
Rest of the world (ROW) is most controversial one, partially due to potential
controversial data aggregation and calibration. ROW is a huge group of many
countries, which contains majority of the world population and lowest per capita
GDP; it contributes to about 50% of most of global green house gas (GHG)
5The welfare of a country (region) is represented by EV (equivalent variation), which is
computed as: EV(REGION) = U(REGION)* INC(REGION)/100, where U(REGION) is the
percent change in per capita welfare in each country (region) and INC(REGION) represents
income in each country (region).
8emissions. In the context of this CGE modelling, we assume that ROW act
as a single entity and there is one monopoly across the regions. Unlike all
other regions, ROW has slightly higher welfare gain under monopoly than under
perfect competition.
9Table 3 provides the detailed information of rental rate, term of trade, GDP,
private consumption, investment.
As we describe the model structure in Appendix A, energy sectors are capital
intensive industry. Emission taxes in energy sectors increase the production
cost, rental rates on energy intensive commodity decrease in all the regions in
imperfect competition scenario when compared with in the perfect competition
scenario. In perfect competition scenario, the regions that have emission taxes
target control have lower rate of capital return. Only EEFSU, CHIND and RoW
has a very small positive rate of return on capital. Under monopoly scenario,
all the regions have negative rate of return on capital due to decline in capital
intensive energy goods.
Term of trade,deﬁned as the ratio of the prices of a country’s exports to the
prices of its imports, both suitably weighted, is a key mechanism inﬂuencing
the distribution of losses and gains between regions. Carbon emission target
reductions raise the costs of energy-intensive goods manufactured in countries
with emission restriction, therefore change the term of trade and comparative
advantage of energy sectors in those countries. Oil exporting countries such
as EEx is hurt badly due to adverse of term of trade. Compared with perfect
competition scenario, the term of trade of EU, EEx and Japan has adverse eﬀects
while term of trade of RoA1, USA, EEFSU, CHIND and ROW has improved
under monopoly.
The results of investment share similar pattern as capital rate of return.
Lower return on capital drives down investment in all the regions except RoA1.
The increase in investment in RoA1 is due to signiﬁcant improvement in term
of trade related to the other regions.
It is not surprise to see that private consumptions fall down in all the regions
except CHIND and ROW in the case of both scenarios. Welfare gains in CHIND
and ROW mainly attribute to improvement of term of trade compared with
other regions.
Total GDP changes in diﬀerent regions vary due to the emission tax. Under
perfect competition, it is obvious to observe that the GDP falls down in all the
regions except CHIND and ROW. Under monopoly scenario, only EEFSU and
EEx have about 2 % improvement in GDP compared with perfect competition.
4.2 Sectoral Eﬀect Under Perfect Competition
The macroeconomic eﬀects of carbon taxation under imperfect competition do
not diﬀer much qualitatively from those under perfect competition. Considering
ﬁrst the perfect competition case, as displayed in Table 4, on one hand, output of
ﬁve energy sectors in most regions experiences signiﬁcant decline due to emission
taxes. In addition, the regions that have carbon emission target control(USA,
EU, Japan, RoA1) have further decline in output, especially energy sectors are
hit the hardest. So do the energy related sectors, which are complementing
sectors related to energy sectors such as energy intensive industry(EnIntind) in
these four regions suﬀer losses of output. On the other hand, agriculture sectors
10and some non-energy sectors in EEFSU, EEx, CHIND and RoW have a slight
expansion.
These results satisfy the factor price equalization theory. The imposition
of carbon emission taxes on energy sectors increase prices of primary factors
in energy intensive sectors. Output of energy sectors drops while output in
other sectors expands. Resources do not move from energy intensive sectors to
non-energy intensive sectors until factor price equalize between all the sectors.
4.3 Sectoral Eﬀect Under Imperfect Competition
Emission taxes reallocate the resources between sectors due to factor price equal-
ization eﬀect, and also change the comparative advantage between regions re-
gardless the market structure. There are several interesting ﬁndings that we can
see from these two experiments. First, under imperfect competition (Monopoly)
scenario, output of energy sectors in most regions experience further reduction
compared to the case in perfect competition. While output of agriculture in
most of regions has further expansion. These impacts can be seen from Table 5.
Furthermore, the impact of the emission taxes on energy sectors lead to resource
reallocation according to sectoral substitution eﬀects.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we examine how the impacts of environmental taxes depend on the
underlying market structure. In the case of perfect competition, the increase or
decrease of the output depends on the whether the regions are energy importer
or exporter, term of trade eﬀects. Under Monopoly , environmental taxes aﬀect
term of trade and reallocation resources between sectors and regions. Like the
conventional wisdom on the behavior of monopoly, the monopoly ﬁrms tend to
reduce output and result in welfare losses.
We employed a global level static computable general equilibrium model to
contrast the eﬀects of similarly introduced carbon tax under perfect competi-
tion and monopoly. We found that environmental tax has strong magnitude
impacts on the economy under monopoly than that of under perfect competi-
tion case. Welfare and output would further decline in monopoly than in the
perfect competition.
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Sectoral Description Comprising GTAP V5 Countries/Regions
AgriculturePrimary Agric., paddy rice; wheat cereal grains n.e.c;
Forestry, Fishing veget, fruit, nuts;
oil seeds; sugar cane,
sugar beet; cattle, sheep and goats;
rat milk; animal products n.e.c.;
wool, silk-worm cocoons; forestry; ﬁshing
plant-based ﬁbers; crops n.e.c.; bovine
Coal coal Mining coal
Oil Crude Oil oil
Gas Natural Gas Extraction gas; gas manufacture, distribution
OilPcts Reﬁned Oil Prods petroleum, coal products
Electricity electricity electricity
EnIntInd Energy Intensive Industries minerals n.e.c.; chemical, rubber,
plastic prod; mineral products n.e.c.;
ferrous metals; metals n.e.c.
OtherIndSe Other Industry, Sve Bovine cattle, sheep and goat; meat prod-
ucts;
veg oils and fats;
dairy products; processed rice; sugar;
food products n.e.c.; beverages and
tobacco products; texiles; wearing ap-
parel;
leather products; wood products;
paper products; publishing; metal prod-
ucts;
motor vehicles and parts;
transport equipment n.e.c.; electronic
equipment; machinery and equipment
n.e.c.;
manufactures n.e.c.; water; construction;
trade; transport n.e.c.; water
transport; air transport; communication;
ﬁnancial services n.e.c.; insurance;
business services n.e.c.; recreational and
other services; public admin. And




Region Description Comprising GTAP V5 Countries/Regions
USA United States United States
EU European Union Austria; Belgium; Denmark; Finland;
France; Germany; United Kingdom;
Greece; Ireland; Italy; Luxembourg;
Netherlands, Portugal; Spain; Sweden
EEFSU Eastern Europe and FSU Hungary; Poland; Rest of Central
Eurpean Assoc: FFSU
JPN Japan Japan
RoA1 oth. Annex 1 Countries Australia; New Zealand; Canada;
Switzerland; Rest of EFTA
EEx Net Energy Exporters Indonesi; Malasia; Vietnam;
Mexico; Colombia; Venezuela;
Rest of Andean Pact: Argentina;
Rest of Middle East;
Rest of North Africa; Rest of Southern
Africa,
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa; Rest of
World
CHIND China and India China; India
RoW Rest of the World Hongkong; Korea; Republic of Taiwan,
Philippine; Singapore;
Thailand; Bangladesh; Sri Lanka;
Rest of South Asia; Central America
and Caribbean; Peru; Brazil;
Chile; Uruguay; Rest of South America;
Turkey; Morocco; Botswana;
Rest of SACU; Malawi; Mozambique;
Tanzania; United Republic of; Zambia;
Zimbabwe; Uganda
Source: GTAP-E document
17Table 3: Carbon tax and macroeconomic eﬀects (percentage change)













































Source: simulation results 18Table 4: Change in Output under Perfect Competition (percentage change)
Output USA EU EEFSU JPN RoA1 EEx CHIND RoW
Rice -0.78 -0.83 0.68 -1.32 1.06 1.32 0.13 -0.03
Wheat -1.08 -0.68 0.92 -0.43 -1.1 1.55 0.18 0.2
CerCrops -0.66 -0.57 0.84 -0.97 -0.37 0.79 0.1 0.02
VegFruits -0.71 -0.52 0.61 -0.23 -0.3 0.42 0.16 0.13
Animals -0.62 -0.66 0.59 -1.08 0.62 0.69 0.11 0.01
Forestry -0.57 -0.42 0.44 -1.85 0.25 0.9 0.02 -0.11
Fishing -0.04 -0.18 0.82 -2.64 -0.47 0.31 0.24 0.26
Coal -37.06 -41.54 -5.97 -30.74 -41.22 -16.6 -6.11 -16.15
Oil -4.37 -4.31 -2.72 -7.23 -3.99 -3.61 -2.51 -3.01
Gas -16.58 -29.92 -2.14 -52.99 -21 -8.17 -0.57 0.45
OilPcts -5.86 -6.43 1.54 -19.04 -20.42 2.11 2.09 2.76
Electricity -4.97 -6.69 7.99 -2.68 -13.57 1.99 0.84 3.7
Water -0.17 -0.98 0.01 -0.85 -0.33 -0.16 0.36 0.41
EnIntind -0.17 -1.88 4.28 -2.9 -7.52 3.15 1.24 2.2
Othind -0.49 -0.73 0.78 -1.35 0.72 1.59 0.24 -0.07
MServ -0.09 -0.23 -0.03 -0.24 -0.73 -0.04 0.15 -0.04
NMserv 0.07 0.02 -0.42 -0.56 -0.53 -0.6 0.03 0.15
CGDS 0.14 0.06 -0.18 0.02 -1.24 -0.53 0.05 -0.05
Source: simulation results
19Table 5: Change in Output under Monopoly (percentage change)
Output USA EU EEFSU JPN RoA1 EEx CHIND RoW
Rice 3.89 16.1 4.14 0.48 5.28 0.47 13.39 3.61
Wheat -2.38 3.24 4.38 3.05 8.75 4.94 12.86 8.48
CerCrops 3.55 8.1 4.17 4.84 5.65 6.24 1.13 4.19
VegFruits 6.73 11.84 5.57 6.93 6.81 4.03 -1.37 4.82
Animals 2.85 4.92 4.42 1.15 1.5 0.83 -3.91 3.18
Forestry -0.06 0.56 0.17 -1.54 -0.77 -0.2 -3.35 -2.64
Fishing 3.36 2.87 4.38 1.93 2.77 4.69 2.64 3.26
Coal -27.27 -31.7 1.61 -3.84 -8.38 -0.99 -0.5 -0.36
Oil -16.64 -6.01 -2.22 -9.94 -9.02 -5.48 -2.5 -3.52
Gas -21.76 -21.69 0.5 -45.09 -16.82 -3.51 -0.85 -0.36
OilPcts -20.19 -7.77 1.35 -17.04 -18.4 1.53 -1.1 0.99
Electricity -3.05 -3.91 4.8 -1.15 -7.44 1.31 0.78 1.83
Water 2.36 0.78 0.39 -0.21 -0.42 0.17 -2.42 0
EnIntind -1.58 -0.77 3.06 -1.74 -6.27 1.86 -0.49 1.69
Othind 1.17 1.32 1.23 0.27 -0.42 0.15 -3.08 0.01
MServ -1.07 -1.34 -1.14 -0.85 -1.01 -0.36 -1.88 -1.26
NMserv -1 -1.72 -1.36 -1.12 -0.81 -0.48 -0.19 -1.21
CGDS -0.16 -0.69 -0.21 -0.53 0.01 -0.34 0.06 -0.46
Source: simulation results
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